Edward Riche v. North Ogden Professional Corporation : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Edward Riche v. North Ogden Professional
Corporation : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John P. Sampson; Attorney for Respondent.
Pete N. Vlahos; Vlahos and Sharp; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Riche v. North Ogden Professional, No. 860099.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/879
»ft»£f 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KPU 
50 
DOCKET NO. £Lafrt-cjl N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
~ STATE Of UTAH 
EDWA&D A. RICHE, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
Professional Corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
8booqq-c& 
Case No. 20477 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Reply of Appellant to Respodent Brief 
from Judgment of the District Court 
in and for the County of Ijeber, State of Utah 
THE HONORABLE JOHN F. WAIiLQUIST 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
JOHN P. SAMPSON, ESQ. 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 102 Cgden, Utah 84401 
(Attorney for Plaintiff & 
Respondent) 
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiebel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(Attorney for Defendant 
Appellant) 
fPSM r; 
' f § '< ft }' 
y t mm Asrar. %*?JF> 
H ;;fi 
JUN271935 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
REPLY OF APPELLANT TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 1 
ARGUMENT 1-11 
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT, REPLY OF APPELLANT 
CONCLUSION 11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 14 
ADDENDUM 15 
i. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH STATUTES 
16-11-13 U.C.A, 1953 as amended 6, 9 
78-27-56 U.C.A, 1953 and 1981 as amended 13 
UNITED STATES STATUTES 
11 USC 541 4 
Collier Pamplet Edition, Bankruptcy Code, Part 1 
History, 11 USC 541 5 
11 USC 542 6 
11 USC 543 7 
11 USC 544 7 
11 USC 546 8 
11 USC 558 8 
i i. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD A. RICHE, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
Professional Corporat ion, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20477 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In referring to the Plaintiff and Respondent, reference 
will state "RICHE" and in referring to the Defendant and 
Appellant, a Medical Professional Corporation, reference 
will be made to "PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION". 
1. RICHE CONTENDS that all of the issues of the "Pro-
fessional Corporation" as is set forth in the Appellant 
Brief are contained in the Respondent's Statement of Issues 
Presented on Appeal. (RESP. BR., page 1 and 2) 
rROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES that the summary of 
issues are presented in Professional Corporation's original 
Appellant Brief and is not accurately restated under the 
Statement of Issues set forth by Riche. 
2. RICHE CONTENDS in his Summary of Issues of Respon-
dent : 
"That the Appeal should be dismissed for 
the reason that the interlocutory order 
is not a final order from which an 
Appeal can be taken." (RESP. BR., page 
2) 
PROFFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES that this Honorable 
Court has ruled on the previous motion made by Riche to deny 
right of Appeal to Professional Corporation. Each of the 
parties submitted Memorandum concerning their positions and 
this Court made its ruling allowing the filing by the Pro-
fessional Corporation of its Appellant Brief. Issues 5 and 
6, (RESP. BR., page 2) were replied to in Appellant's 
original Brief and will be additionally referred to in this 
Reply Brief. 
3. RICHE CONTENDS in his Statement of Facts that the 
Bankruptcy Court sold the shares of stock in the Corporation 
previously owned by Dr. Nilsson to Riche. (RESP. BR., page 
2) 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES that Riche purchased 
only the interest of the Debtor held by the Bankruptcy 
Court, that the Court sold only its interest, if any, as to 
the assets of the Debtor, and the sale by the Bankruptcy 
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Court did not constitute a sale of shares in the Profession-
al Corporation but only the right of the purchaser (Riche) 
to be paid the sum of $1,000.00, which was the redemption 
value by written agreement of the Professional Corporation 
with a shareholder as to any disqualified shareholder. 
(APP. BR., page 12-13) 
4, RICHE CONTENDS the purpose of this suit for dis-
solution was to recover the value of the investment of 
Riche. (RESP. BR., page 3) 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES that Riche risked a 
minor investment in purchasing the assets of the Debtor in 
Bankruptcy Court, with complete awareness by Riche and his 
counsel, imparted by both the Trustee and the Judge of the 
United States Bankruptcy Court, that any purchase of the 
interest of the Court was subject to the "Repurchase Agree-
ment and applicable law" (R 243) (APP. BR., pages 5 and 6) 
and that Riche did not make an investment, but made a gamble 
hoping to recover from his minor investment a windfall of 
$400,000.00, as alleged in the Argument of Riche in Respon-
dent's Brief under Point One, page 3 thereof. 
5. RICHE CONTENDS that dissolution of the corporation 
should take place first, together with distribution of 
assets of the Professional Corporation to himself and the 
3 
remaining doctors of the Medical Corporation, and that 
following the sale and division of all of the assets of the 
Medical Corporation would be the proper time for this Court 
to allow an Appeal from the Judgment of the Lower Court. 
(RESP. BR., page 3) 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES that Riche made pre-
vious objection to the allowing of the filing of an Appeal 
Brief by the Professional Corporation, and this Court having 
read the submitted Briefs ruled that the Professional Cor-
poration had a right to file a Brief now and did not have to 
wait until destruction and extinction of the corporation 
first and division of its assets, and then be allowed to 
have an Appeal. 
6. RICHE CONTENDS that the statute of limitations has 
not run, and that the dissolution suit of Riche is within 
the statutory period of right of redemption, and that no 
statute of limitations could run while the Trustee of the 
Court was in possession of the interest of Dr. Nilsson. 
(RESP. BR., page 3 and 4) 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES that (11 USC Section 
541) provides as follows: 
(a) The commencement of a case under 
Section 301, 302 or 303 of this Title 
creates an estate. Such estate is 
4 
comprised of al 1 of the fol lowing 
property, wherever located and By 
whomever held: (Emphasis added) 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 
(b) and (c) (2) of this Section, all 
legal or equitable interests of the 
Debtor in property as of the commence-
ment of the case. 
At page 296 of the 1985 Collier Phamplet Edition of 
Bankruptcy Code, Part I, summarizes Section 541 in detail 
and states in part, referring to said Section as follows: 
"This Section defines a property of the 
estate, and specifies what property 
becomes a property of the estate. The 
commencement of the bankruptcy case 
creates an estate. Under paragraph (1) 
of Suosection (a), the estate is com-
prised of all legal or equitable inter-
est of the Debtor in property, wherever 
located, as of the commencement of the 
case. The scope of this paragraph is 
broad. It includes all kinds of pro-
perty, including tangible or intangible 
property, ***" 
The right of the bankruptcy estate to all of the assets 
of the Debtor, included any interest of the Debtor in the 
Professional Corporation and in accordance with Section 541, 
supra, all became part of the Debtor's estate and gave to 
the Trustee the right to file suit against the Professional 
Corporation to recover the value of the holding of the 
Debtor, Dr. Nilsson. 
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The Trustee of the Court and IRS both determined that 
the Trustee was bound by the "Stock Repurchase Agreement" of 
the Professional Corporation, and that the only sum recover-
able from the Debtor was the sum of $1,000.00. (APP. BR., 
pages 21-22-23) 
7. RESPONDENT CONTENDS on pages 6, 7 and 8 of its 
Brief, citing statute of the State of Utah at 16-11-13, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended 1954, as providing redemption 
rights but completely ignoring Point One of Appellant's 
Brief, which sets forth the statute cited and shows a speci-
fic exemption granted by that statute to the purchase or 
redemption of shares of a shareholder TTby private agree-
ment". (APP. BR., pages 9, 10, 11 and 12) 
8. RESPONDENT CONTENDS that there is no question that 
the Appellant had a right to redeem the shares of stock of 
the Debtor, Dr. Nilsson, by reason of the private agreement 
and then makes allegation that Appellant made no attempt to 
redeem the stock during this period. (RESP. BR., Point Two, 
pages 8 and 9) 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES the Respondent is 
ignoring the right, title and authority of the Bankrupcty 
Court and its Trustee as provided for under 542 11 USC 
Section 542 thereof, which vests in the Trustee all property 
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that the Trustee may use, sell or lease under Section 363 to 
deliver to the Trustee property of the Debtor and under 11 
USC Section 543, requires that the custodian of the property 
(the shares possessed by the Debtor) not to make any dis-
bursement from or take any action in the administration of 
property of the Debtor, its proceeds, and requires under (b) 
thereof delivery to the Trustee of the property of the 
Debtor and there is no authority in the Debtor or in the 
Professional Corporation to compel the Trustee to deliver up 
the Debtor's property, even though the Professional Corpora-
tion has a right of redemption until determination by the 
Court as to whether the Court wishes to abandon the property 
or sell same, and as provided under Section 554 11 USC 
Section 554 therefore, and under (d) that: "unless the 
Court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not 
abandoned under this Section and that is not administered in 
the case, remains property of the estate. 
Even though a tender was made by the Professional Cor-
poration of $1,000.00, the Bankruptcy Court was not under 
compulsion to do other than to offer the property for sale 
to the highest bidder, even though the Court may not have 
had any right to deny the reacquisi t ion of the shares by the 
Professional Corporation upon tender of the amount set forth 
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in the agreement between the parties as is set forth in 
Point Two and Three of Appellant's Brief. 
9. RICHE CONTENDS that the Statute of Limitation did 
not run until sale by the Court of whatever interest the 
Court had in the shares and pre-supposes that the Bankruptcy 
Court and its Trustee did not acquire the defenses of the 
Debtor. In Section 558 (11 U.S. Section 558 thereof) pro-
vides that: 
"The estate shall have the benefit of 
any defense available to the Debtor as 
against any entity other than the 
estate, including statute of limita-
tions, statutes of frauds, usury and 
other personal defenses. Waiver oi any 
such defense by the Debtor after the 
commencement of the case does not bind 
the estate." 
The Bankruptcy Code further provides under Section 546 
11 USC Section 546(a): 
"(a) An action or proceeding under 
Section 544, 545, 547, 548 or 553 of 
this Title may not be commenced after 
the earlier of: 
(1) Two years after the appointment of a 
Trustee under Section 702, 1104, 1163 or 
132 of this Title; or 
(2) The time the case is closed or 
dismissed. Tf 
The Court having determined that the value of the 
shares was the amount set forth in the Redemption Agreement 
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in the sum of $1,000.00 and same having been tendered to the 
Court, did not bring an action even though the Court was 
vested with the shares upon the filing of the Petition in 
Bankruptcy, which occurred in 1976. 
10. RICHE CONTENDS in Point Two and Point Three of its 
Respondent Brief, pages 8-10 that the Professional Corpora-
tion had a right to redemption of shares of stock previously 
issued to a qualified holder and in Point Three that the 
Stock Repurchase Agreement is not an unreasonable restraint 
on the alienation of property and then makes allegation at 
page 9 of Point Two of Respondent's Brief a ninety (90) day 
limitation on the Professional Corporation in which to 
recapture stock held by the Bankruptcy Court or loss of the 
stock as set forth in Point Three of Richefs Brief to exer-
cise a purchase by the Professional Corporation within 
ninety (90) days, thereby such failure giving right to order 
the liquidation of the corporation. 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES that the reading of 
the statute 16-11-13 Utah Code Annotated as amended 1953 and 
as set forth totally in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief, 
page 27, the statute specifically refers to the ninety (90) 
day redemption period, providing that there has been no 
provision in the By-laws or a private agreemennt for the 
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redemption of shares, and the Addendum and appendix to 
Appellant!s Brief specifically sets forth the Stock Redemp-
tion Agreement wherein the Professional Corporation has a 
right of redemption of its stock certificate upon disquali-
fication of a holder and is therefore not bound by the 
statutory provision which exempts from the time of limita-
tion a right of redemption entered into by parties who have 
subscribed to the Redemption Agreement. 
1 1
 • 5i5M^£2EL™£^ i n P o i n t Four, page 10 of Respon-
dent's Brief that Point Four of Appellant's Brief (page 19) 
that: 
"As a result of his (Riche) dogged 
persistence in purchase of shares, 
attempts to liquidate and obtain a share 
of his corporation, he (Riche) is not 
guilty of any act giving rise to estop-
pel." 
J ^ F J ^ ^ O N ^ ^ that Riche was never a 
shareholder, never had a right as an owner of the shares of 
the Professional Corporation, and that Riche was never a 
"fellow shareholder" in the Professional Corporation as is 
fully set forth in Point Four of AppellantTs Brief, pages 
19-24, and the further allegation of Riche inferring that 
Judge Mabey rendered any Judgment as to the merit of Riche's 
claim is evidenced in the dialogue between the Honorable 
Judge Ralph R. Mabey and James Z. Davis as Trustee of the 
Court, wherein Judge Iviabey stated: 
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TTI take it that from the argument, as 
well, that it would be clear to any 
bidder that there is or may be a Repur-
chase Agreement, which may prohibit 
certain transfers or mandate certain 
other transfers, and that any purchaser 
would take subject to any valid restric-
tions on the stock. Are there any other 
disclosures that need to be made, Mr. 
Davis? 
Mr. Davis (Trustee): I don't believe 
so. Mr. Sampson is well acquainted with 
the documents. I have personally spoken 
with his client a couple of days ago and 
so advised him, but I do take the pos-
session that I earnestly solicit bids. 
If anybody wants to pay more for it, 
that is fine with me and the estate." 
(R 28-29) 
12
- RI CHE CONTENDS that the ownership of the stock 
passed to the Trustee in Bankruptcy, and that the Statute of 
Limitation in question is one against the corporation. 
(RESP. BR., page 11). 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION RELIES that Appellant's Reply 
Brief, pages 7, 8 and 9 only cover the issues repeatedly 
repeated under Respondent's Point Six and Seven of Respon-
dent's Brief, pages 11-13 and does not require repetition by 
Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant Corporation is a Professional Corpora-
tion, which had a right of redemption by reason of a 1970 
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agreement entered into by all of the shareholders, to pur-
chase its corporate stock at a par value of $1.00 per share 
for a total amount of $1,000.00, which sum was tendered 
first to the Bankruptcy Court and then bid in open sale of 
the stock by the Court fully acquainting any person seeking 
to purchase the assets of the Debtor, (which is not the 
Professional Corporation) and that such purchase would be 
subject to the Redemption Agreement and that the buyer, in 
open Court of the shares by Riche, entitled Riche to only 
whatever interest the Bankruptcy Court had, which was the 
sum of $1,000.00, and that Mr. Riche is entitled to the sum 
of $1,000.00, which is the value of the shares acquired by 
the Court by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act and by the Bank-
ruptcy Code, and did not give to tne disqualified buyer, 
Riche, the right to be a member of a Professional Corpora-
tion and order a dissolution of the corporation, in that a 
Stock Repurchase Agreement is not an unreasonable restraint 
on the alienation of property, ana that the Judgment of the 
Lower Court should be reversed allowing to the Professional 
Corporation the right to the redemption of its shares of 
stock, as provided for in its Stock Repurchase Agreement, 
and that the Professional Corporation having been compelled 
to defend itself against an action without merit and not 
12 
brought or asserted in good faith should be awarded reason-
able attorney tees as provided for under 78-27-56 Utah Code 
Annotated as amended in 19 81. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of June, 1985. 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for' Defendant 
Appellant 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Comes now counsel for the Defendant and Appellant and 
certifies to the Court that ten (10) copies of Appellant's 
Reply Brief to the Brief of the Respondent was posted or 
delivered to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah, 332 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, and that four (4) copies were mailed to Plaintiff and 
Respondent, by posting same in the U.S. mail, postage pre-
paid and addressed to John P. Sampson, Esq., attorney for 
Plaintiff and Respondent, at 2650 Washington Boulevard, 
Suite 102, Ogden, Utah 84401 on this 25th day of June, 
1985. 
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ADDENDUM 
See attached Statutes 
15 
ADDENDUM 
18-11-13 (Utah Code Annotated as amended 1953) 
PURCHASE OR REDEMPTION OF SHARES OF DECEASED OR 
DISQUALIFIED SHAREHOLDER. 
The articles of incorporation may provide for the 
purchase or redemption of the shares of any share-
holder upon the death or disqualification of such 
shareholder, or the sane may be provided in the 
bylaws or by private agreement. In the absence of 
such a provision in the articles of incorporation, 
the bylaws, or by private agreement, the profes-
sional corporation shall purchase the shares of a 
deceased shareholder or a shareholder no longer 
qualified to own shares in such corporation within 
90 days after tne death of the shareholder or 
disqualification of the shareholder, as the case 
may be. The price for such share shall be their 
reasonable fair value as of the date of death or 
disqualification of the shareholder. If the 
corporation shall fail to purchase said shares by 
the end of said 90 days, then the executor or 
administrator or other personal representative of 
a deceased shareholder or any disqualified share-
holder may bring an action in the district court 
of the county in which the principal office or 
place of practice of the professional corporation 
is located for the enforcement of this provision. 
The court shall have power to award the plaintiff 
the reasonable fair value of his shares, or within 
its jurisdiction, may order the liquidation of the 
corporation. Further, if the plaintiff is suc-
cessful in such action, he shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorney's fee and costs. 
The professional corporation shall repurchase such 
shares without regard to restrictions upon the 
repurchase of shares provided by the Utah Business 
Coroorat ion Ac t . 
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78-27-54 JUDICIAL CODE 
from, any ski area operator for jnjury resulting from any of the inherent risks 
of skiing. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 3. 
78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing inherent risks and 
limitations on liability. Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more 
prominent locations within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent 
risks of skiing, and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined 
in this act. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4. 
78-27-55. Repealed. 
Repeal. injury arising from the inherent risks of 
Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch. 166, § 5), skiing and the statute of limitations on such 
relating to notice requirements in case of action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1. 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith. 
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, the court 
may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines 
that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to attorney's fees; provid-
ing that courts may award attorney's fees in 
civil actions. — Laws 1981, ch. 13. 
78-27-57. Attorney's fees awarded to state funded agency in action against 
state or subdivision — Reimbursement. Any agency or organization receiving 
state funds which, as a result of its suing the state, or political subdivision thereof. 
receives attorney's fees and costs as ail or part of a settlement or award, shall 
forfeit to the general fund, from its appropriated monies, an amount equal to the 
attorney's fees received. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 155, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to state-funded agencies or 
organizations; requiring forfeiture to the 
PART IV 
PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS 
Chapter 
78-30. Adoption. 
78-34. Eminent domain. 
78-3G. Forcible entry and detainer. 
78-38. Nuisance, waste, and other damage. 
78-45. Uniform civil liability for support act. 
78-45b. Public support of children. 
78-45c. Uniform child custody jurisdiction. 
state of attorney's fees received from the 
state. — Laws 1981, ch. 155. 
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est in the property. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 
2309, 8 C.B.C.2d 710 (1983). 
Because property is broadly defined in section 541 of the Code, an 
interest in property consisting of possession and a minute ownership 
interest is sufficient to give the bankruptcy court preliminary juris-
diction over such property. Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy 
Court, 647 F.2d 768, 4 C.B.C.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 454 
U.S. 1162(1982). 
Even if funds admittedly due a debtor in possession are subject to 
a constructive trust or other equitable claim of supplier of materials, 
the debtor in possession retains legal title to the account and it is 
therefore part of its estate. Ga. Pacific Corp. v. Sigma Serv. Corp., 
712 P.2d 962, 9 C.B.C.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1983). 
A debtor's pre-foreclosure right to redeem certain property is a 
property right within section 541 whether it stems from complete 
ownership of the underlying property or only of a fractional share. 
Harsh Inv. Co. v. Bialac (In re Bialac), 712 F.2d 426, 8 C.B.C.2d 
1395 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Regardless of a state law prohibition on the assignment of state 
pension fund benefits, such benefits may be used in chapter 13 plans 
since Congress intended section 541(c)(2), which preserves some non-
bankruptcy law restrictions on transfers, to apply only to spend-
thrift trusts, and not to pension benefits. Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 
7 C.B.C.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1982). 
References 
4 Collier on Bankruptcy Ch. 541 (15th ed. 1984). 
2 Collier Bankruptcy Manual Ch. 541 (3d ed. 1984). 
Comment, A System of Marshaling Estate Assets, 25 Prac . Law 
53(1979). 
Note, Debtor-Creditor—The After-Acquired Property Clause and 
Inconsistent State Disclosure—Anderson v. Southern Discount 
Co., 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 797 (1979). 
SECTION 542 (11 U.S.C. § 542) 
§ 542. Turnover of property to the estate. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this sec 
tion, an entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody 
or control, during the case, of property that the trustee ma; 
use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that th 
debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall delive 
to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value c 
such property, unless such property is of inconsequential vak 
or benefit to the estate. 
307 CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND ESTATE § 543 
sett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.), 670 F.2d 383, 5 C.B.C.2d 
1252 (2d Cir. 1982). 
References 
4 Collier on Bankruptcy Ch. 542 (15th ed. 1984). 
2 Collier Bankruptcy Manual Ch. 542 (3d ed. 1984). 
3 Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide Ch. 62 (1984). 
Comment, The Legal Standard for a § 542(a) Turnover, 1983 Ann. 
Surv. Bankr. L. 265. 
Landley, United States v. Whiting Pools, 674 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 
1982): An Analysis of a Debtor's Right to Turnover Order 
Against the IRS, 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 141 (1983). 
Levit, Use and Disposition of Property Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code: Some Practical Concerns, 53 Am. Bankr. 
L.J. 275 (1979). 
Malpass, A Bankruptcy Debtor's Right to Turnover of Property 
Held by Creditors: A Perspective on Section 542 and 543 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 85 Com. L.J. 242 (1983). 
Sauder, Bankruptcy and Turnover Proceedings Against the I.R.S.: 
A Path Toward Reorganization and Rehabilitation Fraught with 
Pitfalls, 4 Whittier L. Rev. 87 (1982). 
SECTION 543 (11 TJ.S.C. § 543) 
§ 543. Turnover of property by a custodian. 
(a) A custodian with knowledge of the commencement of a 
case under this title concerning the debtor may not make any 
disbursement from, or take any action in the administration 
of, property of the debtor, proceeds, product, offspring, rents, 
or profits of such property, or property of the estate, in the 
possession, custody, or control of such custodian, except such 
action as is necessary to preserve such property. 
(b) A custodian shall— 
(1) deliver to the trustee any property of the debtor held 
by or transferred to such custodian, or proceeds,product, 
offspring, rents, or profits of such property, that is in 
such custodian's possession, custody, or control on the 
date that such custodian acquires knowledge of the com-
mencement of the case; and 
§ 543 BANKRUPTCY CODE 308 
(2) file an accounting of any property of the debtor, or 
proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such 
property that, at any time, came into the possession, custo-
dy, or control of such custodian. 
(c) The court, after notice and a hearing, shall— 
(1) protect all entities to which a custodian has become 
obligated with respect to such property or proceeds, prod-
uct, offspring, rents, or profits of such property; 
(2) provide for the payment of reasonable compensation 
for services rendered and costs and expenses incurred by 
. such custodian; and 
(3) surcharge such custodian, other than an assignee for 
the benefit of the debtor's creditors that was appointed or 
took possession more than 120 days before the date of the 
filing of the petition, for any improper or excessive dis-
bursement, other than a disbursement that has been made 
in accordance with applicable law or that has been ap-
proved, after notice and a hearing, by a court of competent 
jurisdiction before the commencement of the case under 
this title. 
(d) After notice and hearing, the bankruptcy court— 
(1) may excuse compliance with subsection (a), (b), or 
(c) of this section, if the interests of creditors and, if the 
debtor is not insolvent, of equity security holders would be 
better served by permitting a custodian to continue in 
possession, custody, or control of such property, and 
(2) shall excuse compliance with subsections (a) and 
(b)( 1) of this section if the custodian is an assignee for the 
benefit of the debtor's creditors that was appointed or 
took possession more than 120 days before the date of the 
filing of the petition, unless compliance with such subsec-
tions is necessary to prevent fraud or injustice. 
Legislative History 
This section requires a custodian appointed before the bankruptcy 
case to deliver to the trustee and to account for property that has 
come into his possession, custody, or control as a custodian. "Proper-
ty of the debtor" in section (a) includes property that was propertv 
of the debtor at the time the custodian took the propertv, but the title 
to which passed to the custodian. The section requires the court to 
protect any obligations incurred by the custodian, provide for the 
§ 544 BANKRUPTCY CODE 310 
graph (2) to subsection (d) excusing an assignee for the benefit of 
creditors who was appointed or who took possession more than 120 
days prior to the filing of the petition, from compliance with subsec-
tions (a) and (b)(1), unless fraud or injustice would result. 
Case Annotations 
Although section 543 generally requires a custodian of the debtor's 
property to turn over such property to the trustee, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) is not required to turn over property it had 
seized pursuant to a tax claim prior to the time the debtor's bank-
ruptcv petition was filed, because in such a situation the IRS is not a 
custodian. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2309, 8 
C.B.C.2d 710 (1983). 
Because it is not a "custodian" under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 
a secured creditor, who prior to the debtor's filing under chapter 13, 
repossesses property of a debtor as permitted by the state statute is 
not required to deliver possession of the property to the trustee in 
accordance with section 543(b). Flournev v. Citv Fin. of Columbus, 
Inc., 679 F.2d 821, 6 C.B.C.2d 965 (11th Cir. 1982). 
Funds held in trust by a state appointed custodian for the benefit 
of one class of creditors of a corporate debtor, including funds di-
verted to the trust both pre- and post-petition, are subject to turn-
over as property of the estate regardless of any state statute permit-
ting the beneficiaries to be paid from the trust account. McClanahan 
v. Metropolitan Adjustment Bureau (In re Metropolitan Adjust-
ment Bureau), 6 C.B.C.2d 1402 (9th Cir., B.A.P., 1982). 
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SECTION 544 (11 U.S.C. § 544) 
§ 544. Trustee as lien creditor and as successor to certain 
creditors and purchasers. 
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the 
case, and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of 
any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any trans-
fer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the 
debtor that is voidable by— 
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the 
time of the commencement of the case, and that obtains, at 
such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on 
all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could 
311 CEEDITOES, THE DEBTOR, AND ESTATE § 544 
have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a 
creditor exists; 
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the 
time of the commencement of the case, and obtains, at such 
time and with respect to such credit, an execution against 
the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such time, 
whether or not such a creditor exists; or 
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than 
fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law 
permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the 
status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such 
transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, 
whether or not such a purchaser exists. 
(b) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor 
that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an 
unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title 
or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title. 
Legislative His tory 
Subsection (a) is the "strong arm clause" of current law, now. 
found in Bankruptcy x\ct section 70c. It gives the trustee the rights 
of a creditor on a simple contract with a judicial lien on the property 
of the debtor as of the date of the petition; of a creditor with a writ of 
execution against the property of the debtor unsatisfied as of the 
date of the petition: and a bona fide purchaser of the real property of 
the debtor as of the date of the petition. "Simple contract" as used 
here is derived from Bankruptcy Act section 60a(4). The third sta-
tus, that of a bona fide purchaser of real property, is new. 
[House Report Sro. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 370 (1977); Senate Re-
port Xo. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1973).] 
Section 544(a)(3) modifies similar provisions contained in the 
House bill and Senate amendment so as not to require a creditor to 
perform the impossible, m order to perfect his interest. Both the lien 
creditor test in section 544(a)( 1), and the bona fide purchaser test in 
section 544(a)(3) should not require a transferee to perfect a trans-
fer against an entity with respect which applicable law tioes not per-
mit perfection. The avoiding powers under section 544(a)(1). (2), 
and (3) are new. In particular, section 544(a)(1) overrules Pacific 
Finance Corp. v. Edwards. 309 F.2d '224 (9th f i r . 1962). and In re 
Federals. Inc., 5o3 F.2d 509 (6th f i r . L977), insofar as those cases 
held that tiie trustee did not have the status of a creditor who extend-
ed credit immediately prior to the commencement of the case. 
[124 Cong. Rec. H 11.097 (Sept. 28. 1978); S 17.413 (Oct. t>, 1973).] 
Subjection (b) is derived from current section 70e. It j^ives the 
